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Reconceiving responsibility:
A review of Iris Marion Young’s Responsibility for Justice1

Eric S. Godoy
*This is the pre-publication version. The published version is in Philosophy & Social Criticism
39 (6), 591-595. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453713485724.
In Responsibility for Justice, published five years after her untimely death, Iris Marion Young
addresses the difficulties of thinking about responsibility in our complex, globally interconnected
world. Our everyday errands, such as shopping for food, clothing, and even light bulbs now raise
questions about our connection to grave injustices that occur around the world. Yet the limits of
our ability to think seriously about these connections are evident. Even tracking responsibility
within localized events is difficult when multiple layers of agency are involved. For instance, is
BP, Transocean, or Halliburton responsible for the Deepwater debacle?2
Unfortunately, Young began working on these questions—so pressing in our time—just a
few years before she passed away. Yet the fruits of her labors are promising. Her recent book is a
serious development of her social connection model of responsibility, a way of thinking about
and deriving responsibility from “belonging together with others in a system of interdependent
processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realize
projects” (105). This model received attention in the final chapter of her previous book.3 Those
who have been following her work will recognize that Responsibility for Justice continues along
these lines, but that it offers a number of new and newly reinforced arguments. It is a
concentrated and focused effort to think through the complex relationship between individual
responsibility and structural injustice, a distinct form of injustice that results from “large
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numbers of people acting according to normally accepted rules and practices,” which “cannot be
traced directly to any particular contributors to the process” (100). Her premise is that we lack
the conceptual tools for understanding this relationship and her task is to reconceive
responsibility in light of this shortcoming (26-7).
The first two chapters lay the ground for her social connection model detailed in the
following three chapters. In the remainder of the book, Young traces the implications of this
model and deals with possible objections. I will highlight the unique and useful features of her
approach to group responsibility established in the first three chapters, and, afterwards, offer a
few criticisms.
Chapter one opens by discussing the “seismic shift” (3) that occurred in political and
academic discourse on responsibility beginning in the early 1980s and leading to the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 under US President Bill
Clinton. During this time, the source of poverty was relocated from larger political-economic
structures to a perceived deficit of personal responsibility in poor citizens. This “discourse of
personal responsibility” proclaims that social welfare only discourages the poor from being
accountable for their bad decisions, thereby perpetuating the problem of poverty—a position
summarized by the phrase “welfare dependency.” Young shows how policy writers, such as
Lawrence Mead and Charles Murray, and liberal egalitarian philosophers, such as Ronald
Dworkin, endorse this welfare ethics of personal accountability to the gross neglect of structural
injustices. Most importantly, she highlights three assumptions made in the “discourse of personal
responsibility” (4):

1. it poses a false dichotomy: poverty results from either structures or personal choice, but
not both;
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2. it presumes we can ignore the background conditions that contribute to poverty when
focusing on personal choices; that the poor can improve their standing if they simply put
forth the effort;
3. by focusing on the personal choices of only the poor, it overlooks the ways in which the
rich and middle-class neglect their responsibilities. “Implicitly it assumes that everyone
else properly discharges their responsibilities and that the poor in particular act in deviant
ways that unfairly force others to incur costs” (ibid.).
Young makes it clear that she does not advocate for the abandonment of personal responsibility;
her argument is that the dominant trend in discourse on responsibility is to overlook structural
causes of injustice. Even Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism fails to uncover what is morally salient
about this form of injustice. Dworkin argues that the arbitrary distribution of talents (e.g., good
vision and intelligence) should not be the grounds for an unequal distribution of resources in
society; only personal choice, not luck, should affect resource distribution.4 However, Young
claims his approach does not account for how background structures determine what we consider
a talent or a disadvantage: “A person’s vision impairment impedes his ability to be a good civil
engineer only in a society that fails to offer educational and employment opportunities that
accommodate persons with different physical abilities” (31). We must keep in mind both
personal choices and the structural backgrounds that frame those choices when thinking about
responsibility.
Having diagnosed the bias toward personal responsibility, chapter two highlights some
unique features of structural injustice. Although Young agrees with Rawls that structures are the
subject of justice, she insists that they are not part of society: “instead they involve, or become
visible in a certain way of looking at the whole society, one that sees patterns in relations among
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people and the positions they occupy relative to one another” (70). A significant trait of
structural injustice is therefore its invisibility at the level of individual actions; we can only
observe it on the level of interconnected structural processes since its harms are not the result of
any ill intentions or immoral actions. This invisibility explains part of our temptation to hold
individuals, but not structures, responsible.
I find this turn to social-structural processes particularly insightful. Most writers on
collective or shared responsibility focus on groups, organizations, or institutions. The trouble is
explaining how these collectives bear resemblance to individual moral agents (i.e., whether they
have intentions, freedom to act, deliberative processes for decision-making, etc.).5 Processes, on
the other hand, need not bear resemblance to individual agents; they are the result of many
agents acting together. This focus is fitting since a) the harms of structural injustice are not
reducible to individual intentional acts, and b) it bypasses the metaphysical sticking points that
often plague discussions of group responsibility.6 Consequently, by looking at how individuals
are connected to unjust social processes, Young is able to offer a novel way of thinking about
shared responsibility.
Chapter three offers two more useful distinctions arrived at via dialogue with Arendt’s
thoughts on collective responsibility. First, our common notion of responsibility is often reduced
to meaning guilt, shame, or fault—a hangover from the legalistic, liability model from which it
derives (97-104). Arendt highlights an important limitation to a responsibility reduced to mere
guilt: “Where all are guilty, nobody is. Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is
strictly personal” (76 [quoted]). In other words, the concept loses its grip when applied to
collectives (77). Alternatively, “[m]any share responsibility without being guilty” (78). Shared
responsibility is always political for Arendt and here Young agrees. Yet Young calls Arendt’s
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derivation of such shared responsibility from political membership a “mystification”; one must
be connected causally to injustice in order to be held responsible for it (79). Second, while
Arendt only uses political responsibility to address past injustices, Young highlights the
“forward-looking” potential of a responsibility disentangled from guilt. This kind of
responsibility can direct us to change unjust structures for the better, speak out against them,
mobilize opposition against them, or “act together to transform the institutions to promote better
ends” (92).
Young’s social connection model is therefore comprised of a unique amalgam of
thoughts about responsibility. She maintains that individuals who intentionally participate in
unjust processes implicitly endorse them and explicitly sustain them through their participation
(Giddens is indeed in the background here) (59-62). By singling out as morally salient
participation in unjust processes rather than group membership, she preserves causal connection,
typically important for holding any type of agent responsible. This feature of agency is often
obscured in more hyperbolized breeds of existentialist responsibility—e.g., whether we are
responsible for our attitudes.7 Furthermore, it resists the reduction of responsibility to a practice
(based on utility or precedent) that claims the metaphysical features of agency are irrelevant to
responsibility.8 She expands responsibility beyond its usual individualistic focus without losing
site of the individual, and thus without needing to delve into the metaphysics of group agency
(where the boundaries of one group end and another begin), and without needing to pinpoint a
single (guilty) agent who caused the harm.
Where Young’s model begins to break down is in its practical application—though, to be
fair, she does admit that the shared responsibility resulting from social connection is political,
and as such, messy (148). Chapter five suggests that social connection responsibility is relative to
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one’s power, privilege, interest, and collective ability (144-7). Sweatshop laborers, for instance,
have a greater interest in correcting the injustice they suffer than do western consumers of
sweatshop products; because wealthy and middle class consumers occupy a privileged position
within the connected processes, they have different responsibilities than poorer consumers (1456). Although those suffering injustice have the greatest interest in ending it, it is not clear who
gets to identify the presence of an injustice (or privilege). It seems that her model assumes a
democratic method by which sufferers of injustice can voice their grievances in a clear way to
those with whom they are socially connected. The proposition that western, affluent consumers
should simply take responsibility for workers in the developing world without this dialogue
smacks of paternalism. One should never presume to have a responsibility for an injustice unless
all involved parties acknowledged that responsibility as well; deciding how to discharge such
responsibility requires a similar discussion. Organizations that have a great deal of experience
implementing policy often make dangerous errors without meaningful input from those affected.
For instance, in the 1990s, the UN backed International Labour Organization’s banning of
“unjust” child labor in farms and textile factories left many children without income overnight,
forcing them to resort to sex work or employment in less regulated, more dangerous workplaces.9
Young is wary of the possibility of paternalism here (146), and suggests that part of political
responsibility “is to figure out how to align one’s own interest with those of agents that suffer
injustice” (ibid.). But it remains unclear how this can happen across national boundaries sans a
democratic institutional framework.
Despite these shortcomings, Young reworks, in an extremely useful way, some basic
intuitions about shared responsibility, while happily avoiding many of the obstacles that come
with the territory. Recognizing that moral responsibility can follow from social connection
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means taking those connections more seriously, critically examining them, and finding ways to
respond collectively to the injustices within them. Young states that this is indeed how we
discharge our shared responsibility: “[by] watching these institutions, monitoring their effects to
make sure that they are not grossly harmful, and maintaining organized public spaces where such
watching and monitoring can occur and citizens can speak publicly and support one another in
their efforts to prevent suffering” (88). And certainly, part of this effort can involve developing
reliable means of including, in our collective efforts, more voices of those to whom we are
socially connected.

Notes
1

Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

2

Recall that in a tragically comic way, each company pointed fingers at the other in order to protect their public
image. Matt Daily, “BP, Other Oil Spill Companies Start the Blame Game” in Reuters, May 6, 2010 at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64578H20100506 (accessed October 10, 2011).

3

Iris Marion Young, Global Challenges (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007).

4

Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000).

5

For a recent account of the metaphysics of group agency, see Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The
Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

6

For an example of an attempt to bypass these sticking points, see Virginia Held, “Group Responsibility for Ethnic
Conflict” in Journal of Ethics 6 (2002): 157-78.

7

Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), p. 24.

8

Held, “Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict,” p. 159-60.

9

Neil Howard, “More of the Same in the Fight Against Child Labor,” Dissent Magazine (September 6, 2011) at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=530 (accessed October 11, 2011).

7

